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3Introduction 
Several years ago I wrote an article that discussed the estate tax consequences 
of family limited liability entities (“FLLE’s”).1 An FLLE is a family limited partnership 
(“FLP”) or family limited liability company (“FLLC” or “LLC”) formed for family estate 
planning purposes.  (Under the default rule, an LLC that has two or more members is 
considered to be a partnership for federal tax purposes.2) FLLEs are used for estate 
planning purposes that can be wide-ranging and often perfectly legitimate.  FLLEs can 
be used to provide a family business with a liability shield or be a vehicle for distributing 
ownership interests in  family assets.  But often the primary purpose for their use is the 
reduction of estate taxes.3 Using an FLP as an example, commonly a parent 
contributes assets to the FLP and takes back the limited partnership interests.  Others, 
typically children or other relatives, but sometimes banks or other independent persons, 
hold the general partnership interests (in an FLLC it would be the managerial interests).  
The parent usually does not control the FLP in an attempt to avoid the contributed 
assets being included in her estate under I.R.C. § 2036, though as I will discuss, courts 
have been applying I.R.C. § 2036 even where the parent does not have technical 
control.   The bulk of the value in the FLP is represented by the limited partnership 
interests.  Valuation discounts may be available because the parent’s limited 
partnership interests lack control and are usually not as readily marketable as the 
 
1 Last Gasp Estate Planning:  The formation of Family Limited Liability Entities Shortly Before 
Death, 21 Virginia Tax Rev. 1 (2001) (hereinafter “Last Gasp”).   In writing this article, I at times borrow 
from that article as well as from chapter 4 of The Limited Liability Company Handbook co-authored by 
Dean Mark Sargent and myself and published by West.  West has graciously consented to this use. 
2 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b), -3(c)(1)(v). 
3 Estate taxes are taxes imposed on the value of the new assets owned by a decedent at death.  
See I.R.C. § 2001, 2051. 
4underlying assets would have been. It is not unusual for the FLP interests to be included 
in the parent’s estate at a 35% or greater discount from the value of the contributed 
assets.4 Thus, property that would have an estate tax value of $100,000 if owned by the 
parent directly, might be exchanged for limited partnership interest worth only $65,000.  
There should ordinarily be no gift on the formation of the FLLE as typically the parent 
receives a capital account credit5 equal to the full value of what she contributed.6 If 
there were a liquidation of the FLLE, the parent would be normally entitled to be paid 
her capital account balance.7 Further, the children commonly contribute their own funds 
in exchange for the controlling interest.8 Thus, normally on formation, no value has 
been shifted to others that could trigger a gift and the consequent gift tax.9
Additionally, the parent could, but often does not, make gifts of the FLP interests 
 
4 Kathryn G. Henkel, Estate Planning and Wealth Preservations:  Strategies and Solutions ¶ 
16.03[1][c]. 
5 Generally, a owner’s capital account is increased by the fair market value of the contributed 
property.  As an owner is also generally entitled to the full balance in the capital account on liquidation of 
the ownership interest, normally no value should be shifted to others.  See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.704-
1(b)(2)(iv)(b) and -1(b)(2)(ii). 
6 Some have argued that there may be a gift at this point even though there is no ascertainable 
donee.  See Karen Burke and Grayson McCouch, Family Limited Partnerships:  Discounts, Options, and 
Disappearing Value, 6 Fla. Tax Rev 649, 651-652 (2004) (hereinafter “Burke and McCouch” ).  In this fine 
piece of scholarship, Professors Burke and McCouch,  while acknowledging  the capital account issue, 
argue that the donor should be treated as making a gift as she has relinquished dominion and control in 
exchange for a property of lesser value.  They note that in the trust context, this can trigger a gift citing 
Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176 (1943).  But in a trust, the donor does not receive a capital account 
credit.  Trusts and FLLEs are different beasts, and the capital accounts of the partners are, to my mind, 
not something that can be ignored.  While it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the rules of 
partnership taxation, suffice it to note that capital accounts are a corner stone of the partnership taxation 
rules.  Further, if they are ignored in this context to a taxpayer’s disadvantage, what is to keep the 
taxpayer from arguing they should be ignored when it is to her advantage.  Creating a gift at the formation 
stage would, to my mind, require a statutory or regulatory change. 
7 See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b). 
8 Of course, if the funds for the contribution are first gifted to the children by the parents, a gift 
tax could apply to that transaction if the gift exceeds $11,000.  See I.R.C. §§  2501(a), 2503(b). 
 
9 But see Burke and McCouch supra note 6 at 652. 
5to her children (and possibly pay a gift tax).  The discounts for lack of control and lack of 
marketability generally also apply to the gifted interests, except the lack of control 
discount would be less if the child is a general partner.  A general partner has fiduciary 
duties to the limited partners to protect their interests, which keeps the general partner’s 
control from being unfettered.  Thus the lack of control discount would still not be zero.10 
If unqualifiedly allowed, this technique would be an estate tax bonanza.  With a 
bit of slight of hand, the value of an estate could be dramatically reduced with perhaps 
little change in the underlying beneficial ownership or use of the assets.  Tax advisors 
and their clients loved it.  The Service did not.11 The Service understandably did not 
think a decedent should so easily reduce the estate taxes owed.  At the time of my prior 
article, the focus of the Service’s efforts was on FLLEs formed shortly before death.  
The Service had issued a number of technical advice memoranda and there were a few 
cases on point.  Since then, the number of cases has grown dramatically and are not 
limited to FLLEs formed shortly before death, but also include FLLEs that meaningfully 
predate the decedent’s death and until recently might been have thought by many to be 
“safe.”  As I discuss below, the Tax Court has taken a tough line, usually applying  
I.R.C. § 2036 to ignore the FLLE and include the contributed assets in the decedent’s 
estate.  The 3rd and 5th Circuits (and to a much lesser extent the 1st Circuit) have had 
something to say on the subject as well.  They have not been particularly taxpayer-
 
10 See United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972).   
 11 After United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972), see text as notes to infra, the Service 
initially tended to give this structure a pass.  See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-10-021 (Mar. 7, 1997); Priv. Ltr. 
Rul. 95-46-007 (Nov. 17, 1995); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-10-039 (March 12, 1993).   See Brant J. Hellwig, 
Revising Byrum, 23 Va. Tax Rev. 275 (2003) at 332-334 (hereinafter “Hellwig”). 
6friendly either.  The 5th Circuit seems to be somewhat more generously inclined, but in 
the final analysis  its approach may not lead to different outcomes. 
 
I.R.C. § 2036 includes in the estate of the decedent assets transferred during life, 
if the decedent retains the right to income, possession, or enjoyment or the right to say 
who can receive income, possession or enjoyment.  The purpose of I.R.C. § 2036 is to 
prevent decedents from excluding assets from their estates by transferring legal title, 
but maintaining substantial rights.12 
Given the plethora of new cases, in particular recent pronouncements of the 5th 
Circuit in Kimbell v. United States,13 the 3rd Circuit in Estate of Thompson v. 
Commissioner14 and the  Tax Court in  Estate of Bongard v. Commissioner,15 and the 
tack those cases have taken, the area is worthy of a fresh look.16 I ultimately conclude 
that a modified version of my original proposal, which would generally bring property 
transfers to FLLEs back into the decedent’s estate if made within three years of death, 
could successfully address the prinicpal concerns this area raises.   
The Sham-Tams 
12 United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316 (1969).      
13 371 F.3d 257  (5th Cir. 2004). 
14 382 F.3d 367 (3d Cir. 2004). 
15  124 T.C. 95 (2005). 
16 My fellow members of the academy have not been idle since my first article was published.  
For articles predating the 3rd Circuit’s decision in Estate of Thompson and the Tax Court’s decision in 
Bongard, see Burke and  McCouch supra 6 note which does an excellent job of reviewing possible 
partnership tax ramifications and makes cogent recommendations for reform; another fine article:  Ronald 
Jensen, The Magic of Disappearing Wealth Revisited:  Using Family Limited Partnerships to Reduce 
Estate and Gift Taxes, 1 Pitt. Tax Rev. 155 (2004) (hereinafter “Jensen”). 
7In 1997, the Service issued a series of technical advice memoranda.17 Typically,   
family members created an LLC or limited partnership shortly before a parent=s death, 
when it was apparent that the parent  did not have long to live.  In one case, a limited 
partnership was created within two days of the parent=s death and after the parent had 
been removed from life support. A substantial portion of the parents= assets were 
transferred to FLLEs in exchange for FLLE interests, and the FLLEs interests were 
included in the parents= estates at a substantial discount from the fair market value of 
the contributed assets.  Typically, the children created  FLLEs on behalf of the parent  
using either a power of attorney granted them by the parent or their powers as trustees 
of a  trust created for the benefit of the parent.  
 
The Service made several arguments for its holdings.  One of the arguments, in 
essence,  was that given the proximity of the death and the lack of direct involvement by 
the decedent, the FLLEs were shams.  The Service cited Estate of Murphy v. Comm=r
as authority for its position.18 In that case, eighteen days before the decedent died, she 
had transferred to her two children less than a  2% stock interest in a family-run, closely 
held corporation. The transfer reduced the decedent=s ownership interest in the 
corporation to just below 50%.  The estate claimed a minority-interest discount for the 
remaining stock.  A minority interest discount is the same as a lack of control discount.  
A minority interest is worth less than a majority interest, because the minority interest 
holder often cannot control who the officers and directors of the corporation are and 
 
17  See TAMs 9719006, 9723009, 9725002, 9730004, 9735003, and 9736004.   
 18 T.C. Memo 1990-472. 
8what direction the corporation should take.  The Tax Court denied the discount, stating 
that Aa minority-interest discount should not be applied if the explicit purpose and effect 
of fragmenting the control block of stock was solely to reduce federal tax.@ The court did 
allow a discount for lack of marketability.19 
The TAMs differ from Estate of Murphy  an important respect.  Commonly in the 
TAMs, there was little change in the beneficial ownership of the underlying assets, and 
the decedent continued to hold the majority of the beneficial interests in the FLLEs.  The 
discounts were claimed in large part because the decedent had interposed an FLLE in 
the chain of ownership.   In some of the TAMs, however, the decedent did in fact 
transfer a substantial portion of the FLLE interests, and the IRS nonetheless attacked 
the transactions.20 
The Service did not try to argue for the application of I.R.C. § 2036, perhaps 
because it was unduly intimidated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Byrum,21 which I 
discuss below.  Instead, the Service made an apparently unprecedented (and ultimately 
unsuccessful) argument stating that I.R.C. ' 2703(a)(2) applied.  That code section 
 
19 Estate of Murphy  should be contrasted with the more recent case of Estate of Frank. T.C. 
Memo 1995-132. In Estate of Frank, the son of the decedent held the decedent=s power of attorney.  Two 
days before the decedent=s death, pursuant to the power of attorney, the son transferred stock owned by 
the decedent to the decedent=s wife. The transfer reduced the decedent=s ownership interest in the family 
corporation  from more than 50% to 32%.  The court held that the transfer was valid and allowed a 20% 
minority-interest discount and a 30%  lack-of-marketability discount on the remaining stock  included in 
the estate.  The Service argued that the court should apply the substance over form doctrine and ignore 
the transfer.  See text at note infra and accompanying text with regard to the step transaction  The court 
refused to do so, however, noting that if tax avoidance was the sole motive, a substantially smaller 
number of shares could have been transferred.  
20   See TAMs 9719006 and 9736004. 
21 United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972). 
9provides that the value of property for estate and gift tax purposes is Adetermined 
without regard to ...any restriction on the right to sell or use such property.@ In the 
Service=s view, the Apartnership wrapper@ covering the decedents= assets was a 
restriction within the meaning of  I.R.C. §  2703(a)(2) and, therefore, was ignored.  Of 
course, without the partnership wrapper, the discounts disappear, as the underlying 
assets are included in the decedent’s estate and not the interests in the FLLEs. 22 
The legislative history to I.R.C. ' 2703(a)(2) does not appear to contemplate the 
manner in which the Service was applying its provisions.23 The Code section appears to 
be intended to prevent buy-sell agreements among family members from reducing the 
value of the interests the family members hold rather than provide an opportunity to 
ignore the formation of an FLLE altogether.  And indeed, as I discuss below, the courts 
ultimately rejected the Service’s I.R.C. § 2703 argument. 
 
The Courts Have Their Say 
 
22 In Church v. United States, 2000-1 U.S Tax Cas. (CCH) &60,369 (W.D. Texas), aff’d without 
published opinion, 268 F.3d 1063 (5th Cir. 2001) however, the court held that a limited partnership met the 
I.R.C. ' 2703 tests.  Since the tests were met, the court did not need to address validity of the Service=s
“partnership wrapper” arguments. 
 
23 I.R.C. ' 2703(b) provides an exception to the application of I.R.C. ' 2703(a)(2) if the following 
three tests are met.  The arrangement  (1) is a bona fide business transaction, (2) is not a device to 
transfer property to members of the family of the decedent for less than full consideration, and (3) has 
terms that are comparable to similar arrangements entered into by persons dealing at arm=s length.  In 
the TAMs, the Service concluded that I.R.C. ' 2703(b) did not apply.  It would seemly be a rare FLLE that 
could meet its requirements, since typically the whole point of the transfer is to provide Aa device to 
transfer property to members of the family of the decedent for less than full consideration,@ contra to part 
2 of the exception.  Then again, as I discuss below, I.R.C. § 2036 contains a somewhat similar exception 
for a “bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration” that has been held to apply in the family 
context.  As I discuss below, the Service was ultimately failed in getting courts to apply I.R.C. § 2703, 
mooting the issue. 
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I will discuss Estate of Strangi,24 a case with many lives, in some detail, as it 
discusses many issues that are relevant in subsequent cases.  Mr. Strangi was a self-
made millionaire who lived and died in Waco, Texas.  He was a widower with  children 
from his  first marriage and stepchildren from his second marriage.   Michael Gulig, his  
son-in-law and an attorney, prepared many of  the estate planning documents and held 
the decedent=s general power of attorney.25
In August of 1994, after attending a seminar on the use of FLPs, the son-in-law 
formed a Texas limited partnership, SLFP, and its Texas corporate general partner, 
Stranco, Inc.  At the time, Strangi was suffering from cancer and had a neurological 
disorder.  The son-in-law handled all of the details of the formation and executed the 
documents in Strangi=s name as his attorney-in-fact.  The son-in-law assigned to SFLP 
about 98% of Strangi=s assets with a combined fair market value of $9,876,929 in 
exchange for a 99% interest in the partnership.  Seventy-five percent of that value was 
attributable to cash and securities.  Strangi acquired a 47%  interest in Stranco for 
$49,350, and his four children acquired the remaining 53% in equal shares for $55,650.   
Stranco contributed $100,333 to the limited partnership in exchange for a 1% 
partnership interest.26 Since the children had control of Stranco, they technically also 
 
24 Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 478 (2000) (“Strangi 1”), rev=d in part, aff=d in 
part, Gulig v. Commissioner, 293 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Strangi 2”), focusing on I.R.C. ' 2036 Estate of 
Strangi v. Commissioner, 85 TCM (CCH) 1331 (2003) (“Strangi 3”), aff’d 417 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2005) 
(“Strangi 4”). 
 25  Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 478, 479-481 (2000). 
 26  Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, 417 F.3d 468, 472-473 (5th Cir. 2005). 
11
had control of the limited partnership. All of these transactions were completed by 
August of 1994.  In October of that year Strangi died of cancer at the age of 81.27 
Due to the appreciation in the securities SFLP held, at the date of death the 
assets of SFLP were worth over $11 million, but the estate claimed that value of the 
SLFP interests was only about $6.5 million.28 At trial, the Service argued that the 
existence of SFLP should be disregarded because it lacked a business purpose and 
economic substance.   The estate argued  that by creating another layer through which 
creditors would have to bore, SFLP helped insulate Strangi from an anticipated tort 
claim from a caregiver and helped insulate the estate from a will contest from 
disinherited stepchildren.  The estate also maintained  that SFLP provided a joint 
investment vehicle for managing Strangi=s assets.  The Tax Court largely rejected the 
estate=s arguments, stating that there was no realistic prospect of either a tort claim or a 
will contest.  The court noted that  Strangi ended up with 99.47% of the SFLP, directly 
or indirectly, and that three of the four Strangi children were not meaningfully involved in 
the affairs of SLFP until after Strangi died.  The court therefore concluded that a joint-
investment motive was not apparent either.  Further, SFLP conducted no active 
business. Actual control was exercised by  the son-in-law, via the power of attorney, 
perhaps meaning that technically Strangi remained in control.29 
The Tax Court, however, refused to disregard the entities that were created.  It 
 
27  Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, 417 F.3d 468, 474 (5th Cir. 2002), 115 TC 478, 482 (2000). 
28   Gulig v. Commissioner, 293 F.3d 279, 280 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 29 Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 478, 485-486 (2000). 
12
rejection the Service’s I.R.C. § 2703 argument as being unsupported by the statute or 
the regulations. The Service had also tried to argue I.R.C. ' 2036 applied, but the Tax 
Court did not consider that argument because it was, curiously,  raised only as a 
proposed amendment to the Service’s pleadings “shortly” before trial.30 In the first trial 
the Tax Court allowed the taxpayers significant discounts.31 
The 5th Circuit reversed, holding that it was improper not to have considered 
I.R.C. ' 2036.  The 5th Circuit noted that the request  to add a I.R.C. § 2036 claim was 
made 52 days before trial and that generally leave to amend should be freely given.32
Upon remand,  the Tax Court held that as a consequence of the application of 
I.R.C. § 2036, the entities were ignored and 99% of the net asset value of SFLP and 
47% of the value of the assets held by Stranco (these percentages equal the 
percentages Strangi owned in the two entities) were included in the decedent=s estate.  
As the assets held were included and not the ownership interests in the entities, the 
estate lost the benefits of the discounts, and the value of the estate was increased by 
about $3 million. 33 
30  Id. at 486-488. 
 31  About 31% for the SFLP interests, id. at  492. 
 32   Gulig v. Commissioner, 293 F.3d 279, 281 (5th Cir. 2002). 
33  Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, 85 TCM 1331 (2003). 
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Some additional background on I.R.C. § 2036:  If a decedent has a mere life 
estate or other life interest in property that ends at death, the interest is not included in 
the decedent’s gross estate under I.R.C. § 2033, in many respects the starting point for 
determining what is included in the decedent’s estate.34 In and of itself, this could mean 
that a decedent could gratuitously transfer property to a trust, retain the income from it, 
and avoid estate tax on the principal.  If allowed, this could eviscerate the estate tax.  
Decedents would gleefully transfer property in trust, keep the income, and wave at the 
taxman as he passed by. 35 Congress addressed this issue early on.  The  1916 estate 
tax rules provided that the estate included transfers “with respect to which the decedent 
had created a trust, in contemplation of, or intended to take effect in possession or 
enjoyment at or after his death.”36 What became I.R.C. § 2036 was actually a reaction 
by Congress to a Supreme Court decision.37 In May v. Heiner,38 the decedent made a 
lifetime transfer of securities in trust, with income payable to her husband for life and 
then to the decedent for life, with the trust corpus to be distributed to her children on her 
death.  The Supreme Court ruled that the transfer was not made in “contemplation of 
death” under the statute and thus not included in the decedent’s estate. Congress 
responded by addressing the issue more comprehensively in what became, with some 
additional downstream tweaking,  I.R.C. § 2036(a): 
 
34 I.R.C. § 2033 provides that “The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all 
property to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death.”; see Richard 
Stephens, Guy B. Maxfield, Stephen A. Lind, and Robert B. Smith, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation, ¶ 
4.05[5][b] (hereinafter  “E&G Taxation”). 
35 See E&G Taxation at ¶ 4.08. 
36 Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756, 777-778. 
37 Supreme Court tax cases remind me of a comment by my friend and colleague at the 
University of Baltimore Law School, Prof. Jack Lynch:  The Supreme Court decides four tax cases a year, 
two for the taxpayer, two for the government, and all wrong. 
38 281 U.S. 238 (1930). 
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(a) General rule. The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all 
property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at 
any time made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an 
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or 
otherwise, under which he has retained for his life or for any period not 
ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period which does 
not in fact end before his death-- 
 (1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the 
property, or 
 (2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate 
the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income 
therefrom. 
 
I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) has two alternative tests, “possession or enjoyment” or “right 
to income.” Enjoyment has been defined as “synonymous with a substantial present 
economic benefit.”39 Further, I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) can apply if there is only an implied 
understanding that the decedent will retain possession or enjoyment, even if the right to 
do so is not legally enforceable.40 
39 Estate of McNichol v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667, 671 (3d Cir. 1959). 
40  Estate of Maxwell v. Commissioner, 3 F.3d 591, 593 (2d Cir. 1993); Estate of Reichardt v. 
Commissioner, 114 T.C. 144 (2000); Estate of Schauerhamer v. Commissioner, TC Memo 1997-242. 
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The word “right” in I.R.C. ' 2036(a)(2) connotes “an ascertainable and legally 
enforceable power.”41 The statute also adds that it is immaterial whether or not the right 
is exercised alone or in conjunction with others, or in what capacity it is exercised (e.g. 
individually or as a trustee).42
The parenthetical language of I.R.C. § 2036(a) contains an important exception.  
I.R.C. ' 2036(a) does not  apply to transfers made  Ain case of a bona fide sale for an 
adequate and full consideration in money or money=s worth.@ This is a sort of get-out-
of-jail-free card.  A taxpayer who falls within that exception wholly escapes the clutches 
of I.R.C. § 2036(a).  This “I.R.C. § 2036 exception” has been the focus of a number of 
recent cases, as I will discuss.     
 
On remand in Strangi, the Tax Court held that both I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) and (2) 
applied and that the exception did not.  An understanding of the role played by Mr. 
Strangi’s son-in-law, Mr. Gulig,  is critical.   Mr. Gulig held Mr. Strangi’s general power of 
attorney.  The general partner of SFLP was Stranco, inc.  Stranco signed a 
management agreement employing Mr. Gulig to manage the day-to-day business of 
SFLP.43 Thus, as the Tax Court noted, “..the governing [Stranco] documents gave Mr. 
Gulig authority to specify distributions from SFLP, which is entirely consistent with his 
authority under the 1988 power of attorney.”44 In the court’s view, the “income piece” of 
I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) could be triggered simply because the decedent, acting through Mr. 
 
41   United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 136. 
 42   Also see Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b)(3). 
 43  85 TCM (CCH) 1331, 1337 (2003). 
44 Id. 
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Gulig, could distribute SFLP or Stranco income to himself.  As the Tax Court indicated, 
I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) only requires that the decedent have a right to income, not that the 
decedent receive an actual distribution of income.45 The estate’s obvious retort is that 
Mr. Gulig could not so simply do that.  He may have been Mr. Strangi’s attorney in fact, 
but under the management agreement would have had fiduciary duties to the other 
shareholders of Stranco which would have restricted his ability to distribute income to 
Mr. Strangi.  The Tax Court acknowledged that fact, but felt these fiduciary duties were 
entitled to relatively little weight.  He also had fiduciary duties to the decedent, and “…to 
the extent that Stranco and SFLP’s interests might diverge from those of decedent, we 
do not believe that Mr. Gulig would disregard his preexisting obligations to the 
decedent.”46 The court here seems to be finessing the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Byrum v. Commissioner,47 which I discuss below, though it did not actually discuss that 
case in this context. 
 
In the Tax Court’s view, the decedent retained possession and enjoyment of the 
relevant property in a manner that would trigger also I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1),  emphasizing 
that the decedent retained essentially the same relationship to the assets he had before 
SFLP and Stranco were formed.48 The Tax Court emphasized a number of facts in this 
regard.  Mr. Strangi had contributed 98% of his assets to SFLP and Stranco and had 
retained only $762 in truly liquid assets.  Under these circumstances, the Tax Court 
 
45   Id. 
46   Id at 1343. 
47 408 U.S. 125 (1972). 
48  Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, 85 TCM (CCH) 1331, 1338-1339 (2003); also see Estate 
of Reichardt v. Comm=r, 114 T.C. 144 (2000). 
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concluded that Mr. Strangi and his children expected that SFLP and Stranco would be 
the primary source of his liquidity.49 Further, Mr. Strangi remained in possession of his 
residence, one of the contributed assets.  Mr. Strangi was obligated to pay rent on the 
residence, but the rent was not actually paid until January 1997, over two years after 
Mr. Strangi’s death.  While distribution of SFLP funds were made proportionately to Mr. 
Strangi and Stranco, in the Tax Court’s view this did not distract significantly from 
finding Mr. Strangi had possession and enjoyment when Stranco’s interest, at 1%, was 
minimal.  Further, the assets Mr. Strangi retained were insufficient to meet the expenses 
he could reasonably be expected to incur given his poor health, again suggesting that in 
reality Mr. Strangi retained enjoyment of the assets.  In the court’s view, the structure 
looked more like one man’s estate plan rather than a joint enterprise with the other 
partners, who had little input.  Little changed in the decedent’s relationship with his 
assets beyond transferring formal title.50 As the other cases I will discuss will show, not 
keeping enough assets for the decedent’s own support or meaningfully changing his 
relationship with the donated assets is invariably fatal.   
 
Taking the belt and suspenders approach, the Tax Court also found that I.R.C. '
2036(a)(2) applied. In this regard the court discussed the Supreme Court’s holding in 
United States v. Byrum51 in some detail.52 That case indeed plays an important role in 
this area, so I will discuss it as well.  There, Mr. Byrum created an irrevocable trust, with 
 
49  Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, 85 TCM (CCH) 1331, 1338 (2003); Estate of Strangi v. 
Commissioner, 417 F.3d 468, 478 (5th Cir. 2005). 
50  Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, 85 TCM (CCH) 1331, 1338-1340 (2003).  
51 408 U.S. 125 (1972).   
52 Generally, see Hellwig supra note 12. 
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an independent trustee, for the benefit of his children.  The principal of the trust was 
shares of stock of three closely held corporations.  The corporations had a number of 
unrelated minority shareholders.  Mr. Byrum retained the right to vote the shares he 
contributed to the trust.    The trustee had the sole power to pay income or principal to 
the beneficiaries.53 The Service had argued that the right Mr. Byrum retained to vote the 
stock required inclusion of the stock in his estate under I.R.C. § 2036(a)(2).54 The 
Supreme Court had previously ruled that the power to accumulate rather than disburse 
triggers I.R.C. § 2036(a)(2).55 The Service argued that Mr. Byrum, by keeping voting 
control, could elect directors and thereby control dividend payment, effectively giving 
him the right to choose whether corporate income would be accumulated or disbursed.56 
The Supreme Court disagreed, noting that there were a series of economic and legal 
constraints on Mr. Byrum.  The trustee was independent and had the sole right to make 
or withhold distributions under the trust.  Thus, even if Mr. Byrum could cause dividends 
to be paid to the trust, he had no power to cause the trustee to pay them to the 
beneficiaries.  The right to elect directors did not insure dividend payment, which would 
be limited by the economic vicissitudes, policies, and needs of the business.57 Further, 
and in the FLLE context more importantly, the Court noted that  
 
“A majority shareholder has a fiduciary duty not to misuse his power by 
promoting his personal interests at the expense of corporate interest.  However 
 
53 Id. at 126-130.  
54  Id. at 131-132. 
55 United States v. O’Malley, 383 U.S. 627, 631 (1966).   
56 408 U.S. 125, 131-132. 
57 Id at 137-140. 
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great Byrum's influence may have been with the corporate directors, their 
responsibilities were to all stockholders and were enforceable according to legal 
standards entirely unrelated to the needs of the trust or to Byrum's desires with 
respect thereto.”58 
Congress actually overruled Byrum in the corporate context in I.R.C. § 2036(b), which 
provides that the retention of the right to vote stock in a controlled corporation 
constitutes retention of “enjoyment” of property for I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) purposes. The 
Byrum decision remains viable in the FLLE context, however, hence the Tax Court’s 
discussion of it. 
 
In concluding that I.R.C. § 2036(a)(2)  also brought the relevant assets into the 
estate notwithstanding Byrum, the Tax Court  honed in on several salient facts.  The 
court did not state that any particular fact was fatal, but seemed to say that the facts in 
the aggregate crossed the I.R.C. § 2036(a)(2) line. It noted that Stranco, as the 
managing general partner, had the power to determine distributions.  The Stranco 
shareholders had in turn delegated this authority to Mr. Gulig, who was the decedent’s 
attorney in fact, and who lacked the independence of the trustee in Byrum. Additionally, 
under the terms of the SFLP partnership agreement, the partnership could be dissolved 
and terminated upon a unanimous vote of the limited and general partners.  This 
effectively gave the Mr. Strangi the power, along with the other players, the ability to 
revoke  the SFLP agreement and thereby to bring about or accelerate present 
 
58 Id at 137-138. 
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enjoyment of the partnership assets, most of which would, of course,  go to Mr. 
Strangi.59
Stranco’s bylaws authorized the board of directors to declare a dividend.  There 
were five directors, a quorum was three of those five.  A majority of the quorum was  
thus two directors.  It troubled the court that a dividend could possibly be declared by 
the decedent and one other director.  Also, while the minority shareholders in Byrum 
were unrelated to the decedent, in Strangi the other shareholders of Stranco were part 
of his family. Unlike in Byrum, there were none of the  relevant  “business realities” that 
might have constrained the parties’ conduct. 60 Stranco indeed had a fiduciary duty to 
SFLP and the limited partners, but in the court’s view, given Strangi’s 99% limited 
partnership interest, “[t]he rights to designate traceable to decedent through Stranco 
cannot be characterized as limited in any meaningful way by duties owed essentially to 
himself.”61 “To the extent that Stranco or SFLP’s interests might diverge from those of 
decedent, we do not believe that Mr. Gulig would disregard his preexisiting obligation to 
decedent.”62 Further, in Byrum there were business and economic exigencies that 
restrained the corporation’s conduct.  If the corporation had income, before a dividend 
distribution, it would have to consider the needs of the corporation for working capital, 
modernization and growth.  There were no such limits in the Strangi case.63 The Tax 
Court said that the Byrum decision “does not require blind application of its holding to 
 
59 Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, 85 TCM (CCH) 1331, 1342 (2003).   
60 Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, 85 TCM (CCH) 1331, 1341-42 (2003). 
61 Id at 1343. 
62 Id. 
63 Id at 1342. 
21
scenarios where the purported fiduciary duties have no comparable substance.”64 
The Tax Court also somewhat summarily dismissed the possible 
application of the I.R.C. § 2036 exception based on holdings that it issued while the 
original Strangi decision wound its way through the appellate process, and a decision of 
the 3rd Circuit.65 I will discuss this highly important  issue below. 
 
The Strangi case  was again appealed.  This time the 5th Circuit affirmed the Tax 
Court.66 Essentially, the 5th Circuit concluded that the critical issues were ones of fact 
and there was no clear error on the part of the Tax Court that would justify reversal.  
The 5th Circuit also agreed with the Tax Court that the I.R.C. § 2036 exception did not 
apply.  The 5th Circuit’s take on the exception is important, however.  It concluded that 
there had indeed been “adequate and full consideration,” because assets were 
transferred in exchange for proportional interests in the FLP.67 As I will discuss below, 
the 3rd Circuit does not agree with the 5th Circuit in this regard and the Tax Court may 
not either.  The 5th Circuit, however,   accepted the Tax Court’s holding that there was 
no bona fide sale.  In particular, the 5th Circuit held that the “Tax Court did not clearly 
err in finding that Strangi’s transfer of assets to the [limited partnership] lacked a 
substantial business motive,” which distinguishes the case from the 5th Circuit’s 
decision in Kimbell, discussed below.   
 
64 Id at 1341. 
65 Id at 1343-1344.  See Estate of Harper, 83 TCM 1641 (2002) and Estate of Thompson, 382 
F.3d 367 (3rd Cir. 2004). 
 66   Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, 417 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2005). 
67 Id at 478. 
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Strangi pretty much rang the death knell  for near-death FLLEs designed to save 
estate taxes as the decedent breathed her last.  No case since then has sanctioned 
Strangi-type planning,68 though the Kimbell case at least gets close to the line. These 
Strangi-type cases are at least getting to the right result.  While doctrines such as 
substance over form and step transaction have not typically been applied in the estate 
and gift tax context, it encourages the Strangi conclusions.69 Taxpayers should not be 
able to dramatically reduce their estate tax burden by the simple expedient of placing 
their assets in an FLLE shortly before they expect to die, where the estate tax savings is 
the primary motivation for the structure.  To allow this would have the effect of making a 
meaningful percentage of the estate tax optional in a circumstance where the taxpayer 
is changing the form in which he holds his assets, but often little else.  It makes good 
sense, therefore, to collapse the steps and treat the decedent as owning the assets.70 
An argument often made in favor of allowing the discounts is that you cannot 
 
68 See Estate of Harper v. Commissioner, 83 TCM (CCH) 1641 (2002). 
69 For example, in the first Strangi case, Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 478 
(2000), the majority did not attack the structure based on a step transaction analysis or apply other similar 
doctrines, such as substance over form.  However, Judge Beghe, in a written dissent argued for 
application of the step transaction doctrine. See Jay A. Soled, Use of Judicial Doctrines in Resolving 
Transfer Tax Controversies, 42 B.C. L. Rev. 587 (2001) and Elaine Gagliardi, Economic Substance in the 
Context of Federal Estate and Gift Tax:  The Internal Revenue Service Has It Wrong, 64 Mont. L. Rev. 
389 (2003). 
70 And even if the taxpayer is an unusual one who not only changes the form but gives up 
significant benefits from the transferred assets by transferring interests in the FLLE to others, it is difficult 
to think of solid policy rationales to allow substantial estate tax savings for such last minute hocus pocus.  
The taxpayer is not giving up much by making transfers if he is near death, and other than the discounts 
there is likely to be no real reason for the FLLE structure.  If the FLLE were respected, taxes likely will be 
about the same whether interests in the FLLE are given away or not.  Values would not be likely to 
change much between the gift and death, and given our uniform gift and estate tax system, the tax rates 
on the gifts and on the estate are the same. Further, the estate includes gift taxes paid within three years 
of death.  I.R.C. § 2035(b). 
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count on family members to get along.  Thus, this line of reasoning goes, once you have 
placed property in an FLLE there may be a real shift.  A minority interest in an FLLE is  
a lot different that an undivided tenant in common interest in an asset, where one could 
possibly get a court order requiring a sale and a distribution of the proceeds. This 
argument surely has some cogency, but in a last minute structure, which often can be 
unwound after the decedent’s death in any event, it loses most of its power.  Even 
estranged family members can typically hold it together until the near-term death of the 
decedent.   
 
As the law developed, it became clear that under many of the FLLE structures 
used, I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) or (2) would typically require inclusion of the assets 
contributed to the FLLE in the decedent’s estate.  As a consequence, estates resorted 
to the get-out-of-jail free card arguing that the swap of assets for FLLE interests should 
qualify under the I.R.C. § 2036  exception.  The argument has some appeal.  In the 
typical non-FLLE  § 2036 case, the taxpayer receives nothing in exchange for the 
transferred assets.  Here they are getting an asset in return, FLLE interests.  Where this 
argument falls short is that the exception does not say it applies if the taxpayer receives 
“adequate and full consideration.” If it just said that, the taxpayers’ argument would 
indeed have some cogency, for the FLLE interests are in fact a type of consideration, 
and in fact may be adequate and full consideration as long as the taxpayers receive a 
percentage of the FLLE interests in exchange proportionate to the property contributed.  
The exception, however, also says that there must be  Aa bona fide sale.” It is on this 
point that the Service has often carried the day, though the cases often blur the line 
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between the two parts of the exception.  Further, precisely because of this issue, the 
cases have developed in a way highly dangerous to the use of FLLEs in estate 
planning.  No longer must an FLLE be organized near death to fall within at least the 
Tax Court’s interpretation of I.R.C. § 2036.  Virtually any FLLE formed at any time could 
run afoul of I.R.C. § 2036.  The Service so far has litigated cases where the FLLE was 
funded no more than about three years before  death, though the decedent may have 
been in good health at the time the FLLE was formed.  
 
The Bone Fide Sale Cases 
 
The first case to look at the I.R.C. § 2036 exception in the FLLE context was 
Harper v. Commissioner.71 Five years before his death, the decedent created a 
revocable living trust to hold the bulk of his assets.  The decedent was the trustee.  This 
type of trust has no estate tax benefits.  Since it is revocable, its assets would be 
included in the decedent’s estate under I.R.C. § 2038. But the assets held by the trust 
can avoid probate, and for that reason this structure is commonly used.  About a year 
before his death, at a time when he was suffering from cancer, the decedent  formed an 
FLP to which the trust contributed about 94% of its assets.  His two children were the 
general partners and the trust was the sole limited partner. Because it was a revocable 
trust, the transfer by the trust was seen as a transfer by the decedent.  About seven 
months before the decedent’s death, the trust transferred 60% of the trust’s FLP 
 
71 83 TCM (CCH) 1641 (2002). 
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interests to the decedent’s two children.  There were numerous irregularities, including a 
co-mingling of funds, and in a number of areas the general partners of the partnership 
could not take action without the consent of the trust (meaning the decedent).72 The 
Tax Court  concluded  that there was an implied agreement that the decedent would 
retain control and enjoyment of the property.  (The Tax Court had previously held in 
Reichardt and Schauerhamer that such an agreement required the inclusion of the 
partnership’s assets  in the estate under I.R.C. § 2036.73) Up to this point there was 
nothing new or particularly surprising about the case.   
 
What was new, was the court’s analysis of the I.R.C. § 2036 exception.  The 
estate argued that the decedent (acting through the revocable trust) contributed 99% in 
value of the partnership assets and received 99% of the partnership interests, and that 
therefore the I.R.C. § 2036 exception should apply.  In effect, the estate was arguing 
that as long as the decedent receives a proportionate FLP interest, the exception should 
apply.74 But the court said that the exception has two requirements:  “(1)  A bona fide 
sale, meaning an arm’s length transaction, and (2) adequate and full consideration.”75 
The court concluded that the taxpayer fell short of meeting the first part of the test.  This 
required an arm’s length bargain, which could not exist in a transaction where decedent 
“stood  on both sides [of it].”76 Further, the Tax Court held that  the second part of the 
test was not met either:  
 
72 Id at 1641-1646. 
73 Id at 1648-1649; Estate of Reichardtt v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 144 (2000); Estate of 
Schauerhamer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1997-242. 
74 83 TCM (CCH) 1641, 1653 (2002). 
75 Id at 1652. 
76 Id at 1653. 
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“Without  any change whatsoever in the underlying pool of assets or prospect for 
profit, as, for example, where others make contributions or property or services in 
the interest of a true joint ownership or enterprise, there exists nothing but a 
circuitous “recycling” of value. We are satisfied that such instances of pure 
recycling do not rise to the level of a payment of consideration.  To  hold 
otherwise would open section 2036 to a myriad of abuses engendered by 
unilateral paper transformations.”77
This is a highly important holding, and likely the case should not have come out 
as a Tax Court Memorandum decision, theoretically reserved for cases applying 
established law, but instead as a Tax Court decision, where, again theoretically, new 
issues are to be addressed.78 The Tax Court ultimately did come out with a Tax Court 
decision in this regard in Bongard,79 discussed below.  Putting aside for a moment how 
the court breaks down the bona fide/consideration parts of the test, the court came to 
the correct holding.    To say the structure used in Harper would fall within the exception 
would indeed open the door wide for abuse and bring virtually any FLLE use within its 
fold, including the one in Strangi.  To allow these structures would have the effect of 
severely undercutting I.R.C. § 2036 and could not have been intended by Congress.   
 
While hardly the norm, there are cases where the FLLE structure is organized on 
 
77 Id at 1653 (emphasis supplied). 
78 Though the case found some support in Estate of Reichardtt, 114 T.C. 144 (2000), the Harper 
case expressed its perspective in new and important way. 
79 Estate of Bongard v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 95 (2005).
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a more arm’s-length basis.  The Tax Court gave us an example in Estate of Stone v. 
Commissioner.80 This highly complex case involved the estate of the patriarch of a 
wealthy family whose children could not get along. The primary source of the family’s 
wealth was a sports apparel manufacturing business. Bitter litigation had arisen 
between the children about the management of the sports apparel company,  and there 
were strong rivalries among the children as to who would succeed to which of their 
parents’ assets.  The decedent and his wife, who were elderly, also wanted help in 
managing their own assets, which were substantial and diverse.  There was some 
suggestion in the case that the parents truly needed help in managing their assets and 
that the children were concerned that their parents not dissipate their wealth.   
Legitimate negotiations took place  that involved the children and their parents, all of 
whom were represented by counsel.81 
To resolve these issues, the Stones transferred substantial assets to a series of 
FLPs in exchange for limited partnership interests.  Different children made different and 
meaningful contributions to different FLPs in exchange for general and limited 
partnership interests, the idea being that on their parents’ deaths, a given child would 
receive much of her share of the parents’ assets  based on the assets held by the FLP 
in which she held an interest.  The children were actively involved in the  FLPs as 
general partners.82 The court found that the primary reason the Stone family became 
interested in exploring the use of family limited partnerships was to resolve the 
 
80 86 TCM (CCH) 551 (2003). 
81 Id at 552-578. 
82 Id. 
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children’s concerns regarding their parents’ assets.83 The court specifically found that 
the transfers by the decedent and his wife were not gifts to their children, and that  there 
were legitimate nontax reasons for the transfers. Further, the decedent  retained 
substantial assets for the support of him and his wife and he and his wife were in good 
health during most of the negotiations.84 The fact that  the decedent died four months 
after the FLLEs were funded was not considered to be significant.85 
Under these circumstances, the Tax Court  held that the I.R.C. § 2036 exception 
applied to the exchange of property for interests in several FLPs.86 The Tax Court’s 
decision was consistent with its holding in Harper.   In Stone you could not say the 
decedent was on both sides of the transaction.  His children were actively involved in 
the negotiations.  The transfer was motivated  by investment and business concerns, 
and indeed probably would not have happened but for those concerns. The fact that the 
Stones kept substantial assets for themselves undermined any argument that there was 
an implied agreement that the assets of the FLPs would be used primarily for their 
benefit, which caused the decedents to lose in cases like Reichardt, Schauerhamer, 
and Harper. The estate tax savings were likely not a meaningful factor in the decision to 
form the FLPs, making Stone a truly unusual case.   
 
A rather more typical case is Estate of Kimbell v. United States.87 This case was 
 
83 Id at 557. 
84 Id at 579-580. 
85 Id at 569-573. 
86 Id at 580-581. 
87 371 F.3d 257  (5th Cir. 2004). 
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first litigated in Federal District Court, and thus did not come up through the Tax Court.88 
While the facts were in some respects reminiscent of those in Strangi, and the case was 
far closer to the line than Stone, there were important differences.    
 
Here the crucial entities were formed about two months before the decedent died 
at the age of 96.  Unlike in Stone, there was no suggestion of legitimate negotiations 
between the parties.  As in Harper, the decedent had years earlier formed a revocable 
trust to hold the bulk of her assets.  About two months before her death (doubtless 
under direction from her son), the decedent, her son, and her son=s wife formed two 
other entities.  The most important of these was an FLP to which the trust contributed 
cash and assets worth $2.5 million.   The contributed assets included oil and gas 
working interests,89 royalty interests, securities, and notes.  In exchange the trust 
received  a 99% limited partnership interest. An LLC, of which her son was the sole 
manager, became the general partner of the FLP.  A likely  important fact was that the 
decedent retained $450,000 in assets for her own support.  When the estate filed its 
federal estate tax return, it took a 49% discount on the value of the decedent=s interest 
in the partnership.  On cross summary judgment motions the district court held for the 
Service.  The 5th Circuit reversed and held that the I.R.C. § 2036 exception applied.90 
This exception again was seen as having two parts:  (1) There must be a  “bona 
 
88 Estate of Kimbell v. United States, 244 F. Supp 2nd 700 (N.D. Texas 2003). 
89 Working interests are those charged with developing an oil and gas well. 
90 Estate of Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257, 257-260 (5th Cir. 2004). Also see Church v. 
United States, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 714 (W.D. Texas 2000), aff=d without published opinion 268 F.3d 
1063 (5th Cir. 2001). 
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fide sale” and (2) the bona fide sale must be for “an adequate and full consideration in 
money or money=s worth.”  The 5th Circuit focused on the second part of the test first, 
holding that there is adequate and full consideration if the transfer does not deplete the 
estate.  Further, as it had in Strangi, the court concluded that there is no depletion if the 
decedent receives a proportionate share of the FLP interests in exchange for the assets 
contributed.91 In the court’s view, the fact that in Kimbell the decedent’s FLP interest 
was discounted for valuation purposes did not prevent a finding that the consideration 
was adequate.  The court noted that investors who acquire partnership interests do so 
knowing they cannot sell it for 100 cents on the dollar and with the expectation of 
realizing benefits of management expertise, security, preservation of assets, capital 
appreciation, and avoidance of personal liability.92 
In the typical FLLE, about the only way the decedent will not get a proportionate 
interest in exchange for his assets is if there is malpractice of fraud.  If the decedent 
does not receive a proportionate interest, it means that someone else received a 
disproportionate interest.  Ordinarily the decedent would have made a gift of the “extra” 
interest the other person received, generating a possible gift tax.  Typically, one would 
not want to create a gift tax on formation of an FLLE, so if it happens, there is likely 
malpractice.  The decedent can also be defrauded, shifting an extra interest to another 
without intending to do so.  That is even less likely than a gift.  Thus, the 5th Circuit 
 
91 Estate of Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257, 262, 265-266 also required that the assets 
contributed by a partner be properly credited to his capital account and that on termination of the 
partnership the partners be entitled to a distribution of an amount equal to the capital account balance, 
371 F.3d 257, 266 (2004).  These requirements would normally be met in any well-drafted partnership 
agreement in this context. 
92 Estate of Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257, 266 (5th Cir. 2004). 
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made this part of the test a “gimme.”   
 
For the consideration part of the exception,  the 5th Circuit’s decision in Kimbell is 
consistent with its decision in Strangi.  In Strangi, as I discussed above, the 5th Circuit 
also said the consideration part of the I.R.C. § 2036 exception was met.  There is 
significant tension between the 5th Circuit and the Tax Court with regard to what 
constitutes adequate consideration.  The 5th Circuit view is that the consideration test is 
met when proportionate interests are received by the contributing partners.  The Tax 
Court said that simply receiving proportionate interests was not enough.  There had to 
be more than “mere recycling.”93 In neither Harper nor Strangi did the Tax Court say 
how one would avoid mere recycling.  Stone, in some ways the polar opposite of Harper 
and Strangi, said consideration was adequate where the FLPs were formed with little, if 
any, concern for the tax consequences.  Facts like Stone, where there is indeed little 
concern for the tax consequences, are rare, making the case of little value as a 
precedent.  As I will discuss, at the end of the day there is no real practical alternative to 
the 5th Circuit’s “gimme” approach to the consideration part of the exception.  
Subsequently in Bongard (discussed below), the Tax Court almost comes around to the 
5th Circuit’s view, but not quite.     
 
The 5th Circuit did allow that in reviewing the bona fide sale part of the exception, 
heightened scrutiny was appropriate for transactions between family members to insure 
that they are undertaken in good faith, were not a sham or a disguised gift, and  had a 
 
93 85 TCM (CCH) 1331, 1344. 
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business purpose.  The court noted that the inquiry is an objective one, and that the fact 
that family members are involved does not create additional requirements.  If a 
transaction passes muster between strangers, it will pass muster between family 
members.  Having a tax savings motive is not fatal. The court held that the absence of 
negotiations between the parties was not a compelling factor, again putting it at odds 
with the holdings of the Tax Court in Harper and Strangi.94 
With regard to the bona fide sale part of the test, the 5th Circuit concluded that 
there was evidence that the transaction was entered into for substantial business and 
other non-tax reasons.  The court noted the following:  (1) The decedent retained 
sufficient assets for her own support and there was no commingling of partnership and 
personal assets; (2) partnership formalities were satisfied and the assets to be 
contributed were actually assigned to the partnership,  (3) the oil and gas properties, 
which included working interests, required active management;  (4) greater creditor 
protection was available to a limited partnership than to the trust structure the taxpayer 
had been using; (5) the decedent wanted the operation of the oil and gas properties to 
continue beyond her lifetime; (6) the decedent wanted to avoid the costs of recording 
the transfers of oil and gas properties as they are transferred from one generation to the 
next; (7) the decedent wanted to hold the assets in an entity that would preserve the 
property as separate property of her descendants, in the event, for example, of a 
divorce; (8) the decedent wanted to arrange for management of the assets if something 
should happen to her son; and (9) the decedent wanted to provide a means to avoid 
 
94  Estate of Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257, 266 (5th Cir. 2004). 
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interfamily litigation by providing for disputes to be resolved through mediation or 
arbitration.95
In truth, most of these tests could be met by most partnerships.  There are two 
that stand out, however:  The fact that the decedent owned working interests in oil and 
gas wells, and the related fact that there was greater liability protection in the FLP than 
in her trust structure. Any time there is an actual business activity going on, as there are 
with working interests in oil and gas wells, there is a heightened liability exposure, and  
accordingly a legitimate nontax reason for using the FLLE.  Wrapping a business into 
the FLLE package may be the way to the promised land of the I.R.C. § 2036 exception.  
It was also helpful to the decedent in Kimbell that,  unlike in Reichardt, Harper, and 
Strangi, the decedent also retained enough assets for her support.  This helps counter 
sham arguments, but as I will show in subsequent cases, this fact may be “necessary 
but not sufficient.”   
 
While the 5th Circuit in Kimball appears to be more liberal in its holding than the 
Tax Court previously was in its  decisions,  the difference may be more superficial than 
substantive.  The 5th Circuit can still point to the legitimate business needs for using the 
FLP in Kimbell. The taxpayers  in Strangi or Harper could not show these types of 
business needs, though they could in Stone.  Further, the 5th Circuit made a point of 
approving of the Tax Court’s holdings in Strangi and Harper.  For example, it said of the 
Tax Court=s decision in Strangi,  that  the partnership there  Apatently fails to qualify as 
 
95 Id at 267-268. 
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the sort of functioning business enterprise that could potentially inject intangibles that 
would lift the situation beyond mere recycling.@96 So it may be that the two courts would 
get to the same holding on the same facts, but just use different roads to get there. 
 
The Third Circuit weighed in against the taxpayer in Estate of Thompson v. 
Commissioner.97 The decedent, while in his nineties,  transferred assets, mostly 
securities, to two FLPs, one for each of his two children.  He contributed about $1.4 
million to each FLP, retaining personal assets worth only about $153,000.  Perhaps in 
an (ultimately unsuccessful) effort to make the FLPs appear more legitimate, his 
children and his daughter’s spouse made meaningful contributions to the FLPs, so that 
the decedent owned a 95.4% limited partnership interest in the FLP formed for his 
daughter and only a 62.27% interest in the FLP formed for his son.  The decedent 
owned 49% of the corporate general partner, his two children jointly owned 49%, and a 
tax exempt entity owned 2%.  The FLPs engaged in some fairly minor business 
activities, none of which were profitable.  The daughter’s FLP made loans  to members 
of the daughter’s family which were not repaid.  The son’s FLP made some distributions 
to the decedent for his expenses, and both FLPs made distributions to the decedent 
which were used by him to make holiday gifts.  None of the distributions were large. 
About two years after the formation of the FLPs, the decedent died at the age of 97.  
The  estate took a 40% discount for lack of marketability and minority interest discounts 
 
96 Estate of Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257, 265 (5th Cir. 2004). 
97 382 F.3d 367 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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on the interests the decedent held in the FLPs.98 
The Tax Court, unsurprisingly, held for the government.99 The 3rd Circuit affirmed 
the Tax Court and held that ' 2036(a)(1) included the full value of the transferred assets  
in the estate.100 The decedent  did not retain sufficient assets to support himself, a fact 
that, as the previously discussed cases point out, is invariably fatal.101 While the 
decedent lacked technical control of the FLPs, since others owned the majority of the 
stock in the corporate general partner,  the 3rd Circuit agreed with the Tax Court that 
there was an implied understanding that his children would agree to his requests for 
money from the assets he contributed to the partnerships.102 As the court notes, and as I 
discussed above, this triggers the application of I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) unless the I.R.C. § 
2036 exception applies.     
 
The 3rd Circuit concluded that the exception did not apply, essentially tracking the 
reasoning of the Tax Court.  A key factor was the lack of significant business operations 
on the part of the FLPs, particularly outside the family. The children contributed 
significant amounts of real estate to the FLPs, but the partnership allocated income from 
those assets to the contributing child, which “denied the decedent any not-tax benefit 
 
98   Id at 367-373, 
99 Estate of Thompson v. Commissioner, 84 TCM (CCH) 374 (2002). 
100 Estate of Thompson v. Commissioner, 382 F.3d 367, 383 (3rd Cir. 2004). 
101 Similar issues arose in later cases, the taxpayer losing in each instance:  Bigelow v. Comm’r, 
T.C. Memo 2005-65; Estate of Korby v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2005-102;  Estate of Korby, T.C Memo 
2005-103 (the two Korby cases involve spouses that died within five months of each other).   
102 Id at 376-377. 
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potentially derived from the assets collected in the partnership.”103 The daughter’s FLP 
did make an $186,000 real estate investment which the court acknowledged gave it 
some pause, but the court concluded that “the legitimizing effect of the 
…investment….is overwhelmed by the testamentary nature of the transfer [by the 
decedent to the FLPs].”104 Also damning in the court’s view was the fact that the 
decedent primarily transferred marketable securities, assets for which the FLPs offered 
little value.105 This is, of course, distinguishable from Kimbell, where the decedent 
transferred working interests in oil and gas wells.106 
The court wondered if the receipt of discounted FLP interests in exchange for 
assets in and of itself precluded the existence of “adequate and full consideration” that 
the I.R.C. § 2036 exception requires. Noting the decisions that held that for such 
consideration to exist the estate could not be depleted, the 3rd Circuit wondered if the 
fact that the FLP interests were worth less than the contributed assets meant that the 
estate definitionally was depleted since the estate was not replenished with assets of 
equal value.  The 3rd Circuit, however, acknowledged and implicitly agreed with Tax 
Court holdings that the potential for intangibles arising from the pooling of assets 
prevent this from being a hard and fast rule.107 But the court also said that: 
 
103 Id at 380. The daughter contributed real estate worth $49,000 initially and later contributed a 
22 acre parcel adjacent to their residence.  The son contributed real estate worth $460,000.  Id at 370. 
104 Id at 380. 
105 Id. 
106 It also distinguished it from Church v. United States, 2000-1 U.S Tax Cas. (CCH) &60,369 
(W.D. Texas), aff’d without published opinion, 268 F.3d 1063 (5th Cir. 2001) which applied the exception 
to assets transferred to a limited partnership that consolidated administration and undivided ownership 
interests in a family ranch, as the court noted.  Thompson v. Commissioner, 382 F.3d 367, 380 (3rd Cir. 
2004). 
107 Thompson v. Commissioner, 382 F.3d 367, 380 (3rd Cir. 2004). 
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Where, as here, the transferee partnership does not operate a legitimate 
business, and the record demonstrates the valuation discount provides the sole 
benefit for converting liquid, marketable assets into illiquid partnership  interests, 
there is no transfer for consideration within the meaning of § 2036(a).108 
The 3rd Circuit’s view stands, of course, in marked contrast to the 5th Circuit’s 
decision in Kimbell which only required that the decedent receive a proportionate 
interest in the FLP  based on the value of what he contributed to meet the consideration 
part of the test.  I find the view of the 5th Circuit more persuasive.  It has the advantage 
of simplicity and clarity and is easy to apply.  The 3rd Circuit’s view on the other hand is 
fuzzy.  Sometimes receiving FLLE interests will constitute full and adequate 
consideration and sometimes it will not.   The 3rd Circuit’s view suggests that if the FLLE 
operates a business, or the valuation discount does not provide the sole benefit for the 
contribution, or the primary assets contributed is not  marketable assets, than the 
consideration test can be met.  This is an invitation to litigation, with estates arguing 
mightily that at least one of the three standards is met. At the same time, it often will not 
be all that difficult to vault the 3rd Circuit’s hurdle, for example by making substantial 
contribution of assets other than marketable securities.  Perhaps the 3rd Circuit did not 
mean to craft a rule that narrow and would not limit it to the contribution of marketable 
securities, but the opinion itself does not make that clear.   
 
108 Id at 381. 
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Further, looking to general contract law, courts are typically averse to weighing 
the quality of consideration.  As generations of law students have learned, a peppercorn 
can be adequate consideration.109 Second guessing the value of consideration where 
the decedent gets proportional FLLE interests is an invitation to trouble.  To the extent 
the 3rd Circuit wants the FLLE to operate a business before the exception can apply, 
something it continually implies but never quite says, it should enunciate the rule as an 
interpretation of the bona fide sale part of the I.R.C. § 2036 exception generally, and not 
try to squeeze it into the consideration aspect of the test where it does not really fit. 
 
Some might argue that Kimbell standard for the consideration part of the test will 
almost always be met and that makes the test almost meaningless. They might argue 
that Congress must surely have intended a higher hurdle.  Admittedly, the Kimbell 
hurdle is not a high one, but nor is it a nonexistent one.  It still excepts cases where the 
donor does not receive a proportionate interest.  Further, it would not be the first time 
Congress created a test of a less than overwhelming nature.  Finally, following the 
Kimbell test for consideration does not leave the Service impotent.  It still has the bona 
fide sale part of the test, which is a more logical place for most of its arguments.    
Interestingly, given how it otherwise seemed to track the Tax Court’s opinions, 
the 3rd Circuit rejected the view of the Tax Court that the bona fide sale part of the 
exception required an arm’s length transaction.   It noted cases where a bona fide sale 
was found to exist in a harmonious family context including Kimbell,110 and that the 
 
109 Murray on Contracts § 59. 
110 It also cited Bank of New York v. Untied States, 526 F.2d 1012, id. 
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Regulations did not require arm’s length, instead defining a bona fide sale for adequate 
and full consideration as one made “in good faith” and for a price that is “adequate and 
full equivalent reducible to a money value.”111 In the court’s view, in order for a 
transaction to be a bona fide sale, it must provide the transferor with some potential 
benefit other than estate tax savings.  Since it saw that as the primary benefit received 
by the decedent, the 3rd Circuit concluded that this part of the exception was not met 
either  and affirmed the Tax Court.112 
The 3rd Circuit’s test for the bona fide sale part of the test is a reasonable one 
and fairly straight forward to apply.  There must be genuine nontax benefits for a sale to 
be bona fide.  Indeed, as I will discuss, the Tax Court eventually moves in that same 
direction. 
 
The First Circuit chimed in with Abraham v. Commissioner.113 The case, in truth, 
adds little to the discussion, but I will review it briefly since it was an appellate opinion.  
It is in many respects reminiscent of Thompson.  The decedent, Mrs. Abraham, had 
suffered from Alzheimer=s disease and a guardian had been appointed for her.  
Litigation ensued between several of her children over the amount needed for the 
decedent=s protection.  A court approved settlement was reached between the children 
and the guardian under which three commercial properties were placed in three 
 
111 Thompson v. Commissioner, 382 F.3d 367, 381 (3rd Cir. 2004)  quoting Treas. Reg. § 
20.2036-1(a). 
112 Id at 383. 
113 408 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2005). 
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separate family limited partnerships (AFLPs@).  Mrs. Abraham died about two years 
later.114 The court concluded that it was understood that the support of Mrs. Abraham 
would be the first claim against the funds of the FLPs, even though the FLP agreements 
might not have technically required that outcome, triggering the application of I.R.C. § 
2036(a).115 
The First Circuit did not discuss the I.R.C. § 2036 exception except in one narrow 
context.  Two of the children purchased interests in the FLPs for $160,000 each.  The 
amount paid was held not to come within the I.R.C. § 2036 exception because the 
estate did not produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate the fair market value of the 
partnership interests on the dates of the purchases.  Independent appraisals had not 
been obtained at that time.  Had they been, the FLP assets associated with the 
purchased interests likely would have been excluded from the estate.116 
The cases I have discussed to this point have all involved FLLEs that were 
formed toward the end of the decedent’s expected lifespan, though in Thompson the 
decedent lived for two years after the FLPs were formed.  While the language of the 
cases could surely apply more broadly, many practitioners took solace from the fact that 
longer-standing FLLEs remained unscathed.  The facts and the broadness of the Tax 
Court’s decision in Estate of Bongard v. Commissioner117 took away much of that solace 
 
114 Id at 28-34. 
115 Id at 38-40.   
116 Id at 37-39. 
117 124 T.C. 95 (2005);  several subsequent Tax Court cases essentially follow the reasoning of 
Bongard, finding for the government:  Two cases entitled  Estate of Korby v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 
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and raised questions about the efficacy of FLLEs as an estate planning tool.   
 
The majority of the Tax Court judges adopted a two-part test.118 In sum, the court 
concluded that in order for family FLLEs to fall within the I.R.C. § 2036 exception, there 
must be meaningful nontax reasons for forming the FLLE (thereby tracking the 3rd 
Circuit’s view in Thompson), and the transferors must receive partnership interests 
proportionate to the value of the property transferred (with qualifications, tracking the 5th 
Circuit’s decision in Kimbell).119 The case did not involve a last-minute FLLE, but it also 
did not involve an FLLE of especially long standing.  The decedent formed it about two 
years before he unexpectedly died while on a hunting trip in Austria.  He was 58 when 
he died and appeared to be in good health.120 
The corporate and estate planning structures used were complex, and I will focus 
on the essentials.  In 1980, Wayne Bongard formed, and until the last two years of his 
life controlled, Empak, a Minnesota corporation  which ran a successful business 
manufacturing packaging for electronic media.  Empak was the primary source of the 
taxpayer’s wealth. In 1986, Bongard contributed shares of Empak stock to the “ISA 
Trust” for the benefit of his children and a daughter of his wife from a prior marriage.  
Bongard was never a trustee of the trust, but the trustees did make distributions of 
Empak stock to family member/beneficiaries at Bongard’s request, whereupon the stock 
 
2005-102 (husband), T.C. Memo 2005-103 (wife), and Estate of Bigelow v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 
2005-65. 
 118 Ten of the 17 voting judges signed the majority opinion. 
119 Estate of Bongard v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 95, 122-129 (2005). 
120 Id at 97-98. 
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was redeemed. Eventually, Bongard=s son, his attorney, and a close advisor became 
the trustees. 121 
Bongard wanted to eventually make a private or public offering of Empak stock 
and felt that investors would be more likely to invest in Empak if the Bongard family 
ownership were placed in a holding company.  To this end in 1996, Bongard and the 
ISA Trust established  WCB Holdings LLC.   They contributed their Empak stock to the 
LLC in exchange for four classes of ownership units, one of which had governing control 
over the LLC (“Class A Governance units”).  Bongard initially held the controlling 
interest in the LLC, but technically gave up that control with subsequent contributions of 
some of his Class A Governance units to trusts for his family.  Bongard’s son, brother, 
and close associates were the trustees of those trusts.  By giving up control of WCB 
Holdings LLC, Bongard also technically gave up legal control of Empak, though he 
remained the sole director of Empak.  As part of a corporate reorganization, two 
Japanese corporations, unrelated to Bongard, became  minority stockholders of 
Empak.122 
In December 1996, Bongard and the ISA Trust formed the  Bongard Family 
Limited Partnership (ABFLP@) and contributed membership units (not including the Class 
A Governance units) in WCB Holdings LLC to BFLP. The ISA Trust was the 1% general 
partner and Bongard was the 99% limited partner.123 Later, as part of a post-nuptial 
 
121 Id at 96-109. 
122 Id. 
123 Id at 106-107. 
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agreement, Bongard gave a 7.72% limited partnership interest in BFLP to his wife.124 
In a letter from Bongard to family members, Bongard said WCB Holdings LLC 
and BLFP were being formed as a means of giving assets to Bongard’s family members 
without “deterring them from working hard and becoming educated,”125 as well as 
providing a method for protecting Bongard’s estate from frivolous law suits and 
creditors, providing tutelage with respect to managing the family’s assets, and providing 
a more flexible vehicle than a trust afforded.126 BFLP did not perform any activities and 
never acted to diversity its assets or make any distributions.  The Service argued that 
both Bongard’s share of the assets of WCB Holdings LLC and BFLP should be included 
in the estate under I.R.C. ' 2036.127 
The court concluded that the I.R.C. § 2036 exception applied to the formation 
of  WCB Holdings LLC.  In initially focusing on the bona fide sale part of the exception, 
the court noted that the fact that an intrafamily transaction was involved required 
heightened scrutiny, but did not amount to an absolute bar.  The court, therefore,  to 
some extent backed off of its holding in Strangi that a party cannot be on both sides of a 
transaction for it  to be “arm’s length.”  It did not crisply say what would be required, but 
seemed to collapse this issue into another requirement it said must exist in order for the 
sale to be bona fide.  That requirement is that there must be significant nontax 
motivations for the transaction, which aligned the Tax Court with the 3rd Circuit’s view.  
 
124 Id at 109. 
125 Id at 107. 
126 Id. 
127   Id at 109. 
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For the WCB Holdings LLC transaction, the court found that a sufficient nontax 
motivation existed.  The formation of WCB Holdings LLC was part of a plan to increase 
the liquidity of Empak and make it more attractive to potential investors.  The LLC’s 
funds were not commingled with those of Bongard, the members’ capital accounts were 
properly credited and maintained, and all distributions that were made were pro rata, 
indicating to the court that there was a true “pooling of assets.”128 
In reviewing the “full and adequate consideration” part of the test, the court noted 
that  Bongard and the ISA trust each received an interest proportionate to what each 
contributed.  The Tax Court, therefore, seemingly followed the 5th Circuit’s decision in 
Kimbell in this regard, though it waffled somewhat.  While the court cited Kimbell as part 
of a general review of the law in this area, it did not cite it for this holding.  The Tax 
Court noted that receiving proportionate holdings “may not be sufficient evidence to 
meet the adequate and full consideration requirement,” but that two additional facts 
supported this conclusion.  These two facts were that the respective assets contributed 
by members were properly credited to their capital accounts and distributions from WCB 
Holdings LLC required a negative adjustment in the distributee member’s capital 
account.  Further, the court said (now adding a third fact), there were legitimate and 
significant nontax business reasons for the transaction.129 
This does not represent a high point of judicial erudition even without the bad 
 
128 Id at 122-124. 
129 Id at 124-125. 
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math.  The “additional facts” add virtually nothing to the analysis.  The Treasury 
Regulations typically require that a member’s capital account be credited for 
contributions and reduced for distributions,130 so most well-drafted FLLE agreements will 
have those provisions irrespective of how abusive the underlying transaction might be.  
Further, the nontax business reasons were made part of the bona fide sale part of the 
test, and it is redundant to add them back to the consideration part of the test as well.  
Given that the first two facts will almost always exist if the agreement is competently 
drafted, and the third fact will exist if the bona fide sale part of the test is met, all that is 
left is that the FLLE interests received be proportionate to the assets contributed, 
precisely the holding of Kimbell.  It is not clear why the Tax Court could not be as clear 
as the 5th Circuit was in Kimbell, but perhaps it was sympathetic to the 3rd Circuit’s view 
in Thompson (as well as in the concurrence and one of the dissents in Bongard)131 that 
receiving FLLE interests that have less value than the contributed property seems to be 
depleting the estate.  As I noted in my discussion of Thompson, this position would 
make it highly unlikely for a substantial majority of FLLEs (legitimate or otherwise)  to 
meet the consideration part of the test because typically  some kind of discount will be 
there. Indeed, it would have meant the test was not met for WCB Holdings LLC, yet the 
court said it was.  The court should have swallowed hard and just followed the holding 
in Kimbell.  By not doing so cleanly, it created some uncertainty, yet at the end of the 
day the Kimbell holding is the only one that is workable across the FLLE landscape. 
 
130 See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv). 
131 See note infra and accompanying text.  See concurrence of Judge Laro, Bongard v. 
Commissioner, 124 T.C. 95, 133-134 (2005) and dissent of Judge Halpern, id at 141-150.   
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The court saw the BFLP part of the transaction quite differently.  The court 
observed that on formation, Bongard received a 99% limited partnership interest in 
BFLP.   The court did not say, but implied, that there was no genuine pooling of assets.  
The court noted that  BFLP did not perform management functions for the assets it 
received, engage in any businesslike transactions, or attempt to diversify its assets. The 
court concluded that Bongard did not receive any benefit beyond the transfer tax 
savings; there was a mere “recycling” of his assets. In response to the estate’s 
argument that BFLP was formed, in part, to continue Bongard’s gift giving, the court 
noted that he did not make any gifts of BFLP interests.  The only  transfer was of  a 
7.72% interest to his wife as part of a post-nuptial agreement.  The court did not 
mention that there had not been a great amount of time in which to make gifts, as 
Bongard died two years after BFLP was formed. Query if the result in the case would 
have been different if Bongard had had a program of regularly gifting interests? The 
court also rejected that BFLP served to protect Bongard from creditors, as WCB 
Holdings LLC already served that purpose. Given the noted factors, the court concluded 
that the transfer to BFLP did not satisfy the I.R.C. § 2036 exception. 132 
Since the I.R.C. § 2036 exception did not apply, the final piece of the puzzle was 
to determine whether the general provisions of I.R.C. § 2036 applied to pull the BFLP 
assets into Bongard’s estate.  While in many cases that result is automatic, it was not 
automatic here. Recall that I.R.C. § 2036 requires that the decedent retain possession 
or enjoyment of, or income from, the property.  Alternatively, there must be a right to 
 
132 Estate of Bongard v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 95, 125-129 (2005). 
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designate who will possess or enjoy the property or receive income from it.   
 
There was no commingling of funds, Bongard did not need the assets of BFLP to 
support his life style, and indeed did not directly benefit from them.  Thus, there was no 
real way to say Bongard possessed or enjoyed the property or had income from it.      
 
At first blush it might not appear that  Bongard could designate who could 
possess or enjoy the property or receive its income either.  He did not directly control 
BFLP, the ISA Trust did, and Bongard was not a trustee of that trust.  In the court’s  
view, however, this test was met, and I.R.C. § 2036 applied to include the BFLP assets 
in his estate.  The court reasoned that this test was met because Bongard controlled 
whether or not BFLP could transform its interest in WCB Holdings LLC into a liquid 
asset and engage in any kind of asset management.  Under the facts of the case, this 
was a bit of a leap and not necessarily true.  While Bongard did control Empak, as its 
sole director, at the time of his death he no longer was in legal control of WCB Holdings, 
LLC.  His son and close associates, as trustees of trusts holding the LLC interests, were 
in control of the LLC.   The LLC in turned owned the majority of the stock of Empak and 
conceivable could have fired Bongard as director, though that was highly unlikely.  
While Bongard, in his capacity as director,  had the literal ability to cause Empak to 
redeem its stock held by the LLC, he did not have the literal ability to cause the LLC to 
redeem its interests held by BFLP.  Thus, technically at least, it was not just up to 
Bongard whether BFLP could convert its WCB Holdings, LLC interest into more liquid 
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assets.133 Curiously, the majority opinion does not discuss this fact.134 The court might 
have concluded that because Bongard’s son and close associates controlled the trusts 
that controlled the LLC, Bongard had effective control of the LLC, but the court did not 
do so, at least not expressly.  What the court did conclude, somewhat summarily, was 
that there was an implied agreement of the parties that the decedent retained practical 
control of the units transferred to BFLP, triggering the application of I.R.C. § 2036.  The 
court did not clearly lay out how it reached that conclusion. 
 
The estate argued, citing Byrum, that the general partner’s state-law fiduciary 
duties to the limited partners prevents a finding of any implied agreement.  The Tax 
Court concluded that this argument failed in light of  the lack of activity following BFLP’s 
formation, and BFLP’s failure to perform any meaningful functions as an entity.135 
The majority’s opinion rather perfunctory dismissal of the relevance of state-law 
fiduciary duties neither does them or the Supreme Court’s holding in Byrum justice 
(which the majority opinion does not cite).136 Empak had two Japanese companies as 
minority shareholders that were unrelated to Bongard.  Bongard was the sole director of 
Empak.  As a director, under Minnesota law he would have had a fiduciary duty to the 
corporation’s shareholders, which included the unrelated minority shareholders as well 
 
133 See notes 121-122 supra and accompanying text. 
134 Judge Chiechi in his dissent does make note of this fact, however, Estate of Bongard v. 
Commissioner, 124 T.C. 95, 153-154  (2005). 
135 Id at 129-131. 
136 See notes 52-58 supra and accompanying text.  My discussion is informed by and similar to, 
but not identical with, the fiduciary duty discussion contained in the dissent of Judge Chechi, Bongard v. 
Commissioner, 124 T.C. 95, 150-155 (2005). 
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as Empak’s majority shareholder, WCB Holdings LLC.137 It would not have been 
consistent with that fiduciary duty to deplete the assets of Empak through a redemption 
of its stock for Bongard’s personal financial estate planning purposes, particularly in 
light of the fact that the whole purpose of forming the LLC was to position Empak for a 
public or private offering.  Presumably any substantial redemption would have 
undermined any such offering.   
 
Further, going forward, the fiduciary duty of Bongard as a director might have 
included, for example, a possible obligation to cause Empak to pay dividends. Those 
dividends would mostly have been paid to WCB Holdings LLC interests.  The trusts that 
controlled the LLC, in turn, may have had a fiduciary duty to its members, including 
BFLP, to make distributions to them.  The distributions could have given BFLP the 
liquidity to diversify its holdings.  Accordingly, again it was not necessarily the case that 
BFLP’s liquidity was within Bongard’s unbridled control.   In Byrum, which also involved 
corporations with unrelated minority shareholders, the existence of that type of fiduciary 
duty caused the Court to rule in the taxpayer’s favor.   The fiduciary duties in Bongard 
were arguably comparable to those in Byrum and arguably could have caused the Tax 
Court to reach the same conclusion as the Supreme Court did in Byrum.  A critical 
difference between the two cases, though, is that the trustee of the trust in Byrum was 
truly independent, where as the parties that controlled WCB Holdings LLC arguably 
were not. 
 
137 See Minnesota Annotated Statutes § 302A.751; Pedro v. Pedro, 463 N.W.2d 285, 
Minn.App., Nov 20, 1990; Pedro v. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d 798 (Minn.App. Aug 11, 1992) review denied (Oct 
20, 1992).  
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It was a profitable case for the Service.  The original return reported a $45.6 
million estate.  While the court allowed substantial discounts on the WCB Holdings LLC 
units, the Service’s win increased the size of the estate to about $108.2 million, or an 
actual estate tax increase of over $50 million.138 
Estate of Schutt v. Commissioner139 is a recent Tax Court case involving  
Delaware business trusts that were used to hold stock.  The Tax Court held that the 
I.R.C. § 2036 exception applied. The facts are, however, unusual and provide little 
solace to those seeking tax savings with passive assets.  The decedent had been 
married to, and had children with, an heir to the DuPont fortune and before his death 
had substantial assets of his own.  The trusts were formed to protect “core holdings” of 
the family in DuPont and Phillip Petroleum Stock and insure they would not be sold, not 
your standard FLLE scenario.140 Another unusual feature, was that the Service had 
failed to raise I.R.C. § 2036 in the estate’s deficiency notice.  As a consequence, the 
Service had the burden of proof that I.R.C. § 2036 required the inclusion of the FLP 
assets in the decedent’s estate.141 (Otherwise, the burden of proof would have been on 
the taxpayer.142)
138 See John A. Bogdanski, “Bye Bye Byrum, Bonjour Bongard,” 32 Est. Plan. 47 (2005).   
139 87 RIA 2005-989 (TC Memo 2005-126).  See Wendy Gerzog, Bongard’s Nontax Motive Test:  
Not Open and Schutt, 107 Tax Notes 1711 (2005). 
 
140 Estate of Schutt v. Commissioner, 87 RIA 2005-989 (TC Memo 2005-126), 993-1003. 
141 Id at 1005-1006. 
142 Estate of Maxwell, 98 T.C. 594 (1992). 
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The decedent resided in the 3rd Circuit, and thus any appeal would have been to 
that circuit.143 The Tax Court took note of the 3rd Circuit’s decision in Thompson.  The 
Tax Court pointed out  that in Thompson, the 3rd Circuit had ruled that a sale is not bona 
fide if there is no discernable purpose other than tax savings.  The Tax Court observed 
that this was consistent with its own views.  It concluded that the major motivation for 
the transactions under review was not tax savings, but decedent’s desire to prevent the 
sale of the core stock holdings. There was also no commingling of funds, and the 
decedent held sufficient assets outside the trusts to maintain his own support.144 Finally, 
formation of the Delaware business trusts involved contributions from revocable trusts 
created by the decedent and also approximately equal contributions by other family 
trusts which had independent trustees.145 The Tax Court concluded that legitimate 
negotiations took place with the trustees, which refuted the government’s argument that 
the decedent stood on both sides of the transaction, a fatal flaw in Harper.146 
The facts of this case are a far cry from those involved in other cases I have 
discussed and those involved in a typical FLLE. The Tax Court itself emphasized the 
unusual nature of the facts in reaching its decision that the I.R.C. § 2036 exception 
applied.147 Schutt is, in the context of this article at least, best thought of as a novelty 
that is outside the main thrust of the case law in this area and not one that meaningfully 
contributes to FLLE estate tax jurisprudence. 
 
143 Technically, the appeal lies in the circuit where the petition was filed.  See I.R.C. § 7482 
144 Estate of Schutt v. Commissioner, 87 RIA 2005-989 (TC Memo 2005-126), 1003-1013.  
145 Id at 1000-1003. 
146 Id at 1011. 
147 Id at 1010. 
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What To Do? 
Since my last article, members of the academy have made thoughtful 
suggestions for reform.  Some suggest that valuation rules be adopted that would 
prevent value from disappearing.  This might occur by creating a taxable gift on 
formation, even if there is yet no donee.  Alternatively, values for gift and estate tax 
purposes could be based not on the arguable value of the FLLE interest to a 
disinterested third party (the classic approach),148 but on the value of the transferred 
capital accounts (which reflect the full value of the contributed assets).149 These 
approaches would work, but could be overbroad.150 Families are not invariably 
cooperative enterprises, as the Stone case demonstrates.  Further, the discounts are 
real.  An FLLE interest that a donee or devisee receives is truly not equal to the value 
the associated capital account,151 and he may have no near-term access to the 
underlying assets.   Further, fully eliminating the discounts for all families irrespective of 
how long the FLLEs have been in existence is likely not politically viable.152 The Clinton 
administration had no success with a somewhat less aggressive proposal.  It would 
 
148 Treas. Reg. § 2512-1 provides that the value of gifted  property is  the price at which such 
property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any 
compulsion to buy or to sell, and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts. 
149 Generally, the partnership maintains a capital account for each partner that is credited with 
the fair market value of contributed property.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b). 
150 See Burke and McCouch supra note 6.  My brief description of their thoughtful proposals 
does not do them justice. 
151 As I noted earlier, the capital account of the partner who contributed the assets to the 
partnership reflects the full value of the contributed assets.  Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b).  If a 
partnership interest if gifted, the donee receives a proportional share of the donor’s capital account, i.e. 
one that may reflect the full value of underlying assets.   Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(l). 
152 Professors Burke and McCouch acknowledge that their proposal could be controversial.  See 
Burke and McCouch 6 note at 665. 
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have eliminated valuation discounts to the extent the value of an FLLE interest is 
attributable to nonbusiness assets.153 One author suggests that discounts be 
disallowed if the taxpayer’s primary purpose for using the FLLE to make gratuitous 
transfers is to qualify for the discounts.  The burden of proof would be on the 
taxpayer.154 Again, this fairly addresses the issue, but could make for significant 
amounts of  litigation as taxpayers endeavor to prove that their primary purpose is not to 
qualify for the discounts and the Service resists that effort.   
 
In 2005, the Joint Committee on Taxation updated the proposal made by the 
Clinton administration.  Under the updated proposal, the value of a transferred interest  
would generally be the pro rata share of the fair market value of the entire interest 
owned by the transferor.  Thus, if a mother owned an 80% interest in an FLLE and 
gifted or devised a 40% interest to her son, that gifted interest would be valued at one 
half of what the mother’s entire interest was worth before the gift.  In this example, there 
would thus be no lack of control discount.  The proposal provides that if the donor or 
decedent does not own a controlling interest, but after the gift the donee or devisee 
does, the value the transferred interest is based on the pro rata share of the entire 
interest of the donee or heir.  In the prior example, if the mother had gifted a 40% 
interest during life to her son and at death left that son the other 40% interest, there 
 
153 See, e.g., Cong. Budget Office, 106th Cong., Analysis of the President=s Budgetary 
Proposals for FY2001, 93218 (Comm. Print 2000); H.R. Rep. No. 106-658, Providing for the 
Consideration of H.R. 8, The Death Tax Elimination Act of 2000, at 8-10 (Comm. Print 1998); Cong. 
Budget Office, 105th Cong., Analysis of the President=s Budgetary Proposals for FY99, 93212 (Comm. 
Print 1998); Staff of the Joint Comm. On Tax’n, Description of Revenue Provisions Contained in the 
President’s Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Proposal 291 (JCS 1-99, Feb. 22, 1999). 
154 See Jensen supra note 16. 
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again would be no lack of control discount for the devise.  The interest the son is 
devised is valued in the hands of the son after he obtains the interest, at which point he 
has control (this assume control of the FLLE is based on the percentage owned).  If the 
transferor has control before the transfer, or transferee has control after the transfer, a 
look through rule applies if at least one-third of the entity’s assets consists of marketable 
assets.  No discount applies to the portion of the value of the transferred interest 
attributable to the marketable securities.  The part of the Joint Committee proposal 
dealing with marketable securities overlaps with my own, as I discuss below.    
 
The Joint Committee proposal provides that a spouse is considered to own the 
interest owned by another spouse.  The proposal does not provide a general family 
attribution rule.155 
The Joint Committee proposal has much to commend it.  It is relatively straight 
forward and partially addresses the problem created by marketable securities.  But, the 
proposal is in some ways too broad and in others too narrow.  The fact that it applies 
irrespective of how long the FLLE has been in existence, raises doubts as to its political 
viability.  Further, the spousal attribution rule provides a fairly large escape hatch.  By 
spreading interests among nonspousal family members, control (and the problems it 
creates) can eventually be avoided.  Admittedly, family members cannot always be 
expected to get along, but if the FLLE’s assets consist primarily of marketable 
 
155 Joint Committee on Taxation, 109th Congress, Options to Improve Tax Compliance and 
Reform Tax Expenditures, 396-404. 
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securities, they may not need to.  Under the Joint Committee’s proposal, and FLLE 
could exclusively own marketable securities, and obtain all discounts, as long as 
ownership of the FLLE interests is sufficiently spread among family members.  As the 
court noted in Thompson, there is usually little reason to put marketable securities in an 
FLLE except for the discounts.156 My own proposal is time-restricted, hopefully making 
it more politically viable, but would more strictly limit discounts when an FLLE holds 
marketable securities. 
 
In my previous article in 2001, I proposed that transfers of property to FLLEs be 
brought within the scope of section 2035.157 The development of the law since I wrote 
the article in many ways further persuades me of the utility of the proposal, though I 
have refined it in a number of meaningful ways.158 I have attempted to craft a proposal 
that is politically viable, fairly simple and easy to apply, and not overbroad.   
 
Under my modified approach, any contributions made to an FLLE by a decedent 
within three years of death, where the decedent or any one or more members of his 
family controls the FLLE at the time of the decedent’s death,  would be a nonevent for 
Federal estate tax purposes.  The property contributed by the decedent, and not the 
FLLE interests, would be included in the estate.  A key word is contribution.  I am 
assuming the decedent would contribute the property to the FLLE tax free under I.R.C. 
§ 721(a), the general provision that provides that contributions to partnerships are not 
 
156 For a similar (and harsher) criticism, see Laura E. Cunningham, FLP Fix Must Be a Part of 
Transfer Tax Reform, 112 Tax Notes 937 (2006) (hereinafter “Cunningham”) 
157 Currently, I.R.C. §  2035 requires inclusion in the decedent=s estate, gift taxes paid within 
three years of death and transfers made within three years of death which, if they had not been made, 
would have resulted in the transferred property being included in the estate under sections 2036 through 
2038, or 2042.   
158 I draw freely from Last Gasp supra note 1 at 36-41. 
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taxable events.  If, alternatively,  the decedent is paid a true arm’s length price in other 
than FLLE interests for the property transferred to the FLLE and recognizes the gain or 
loss on the contributed property, my modified I.R.C. § 2035  would not apply. 
 
The decedent cannot generally avoid inclusion of contributed property in his 
estate by gifting FLLE interests to family members, as the focus is on control by the 
family, not just the decedent.  Note that if the decedent contributes property to the FLLE 
within three years of death and then gifts FLLE interests to others, a gift tax will apply to 
the gifts based on the value of the gifted interests.  There is no objection to discounts 
applying to the gifted interests, assuming adequate proof is proffered, as the contributed 
property will be included in the decedent’s estate in any event.  Under current law, gift 
and estate taxes are unified and any gift taxes paid within three years of death are 
included in the estate and constitute a credit against any estate tax owed.159 Those 
rules would continue to apply under my proposal.  Thus, while the decedent might not 
improve his estate tax position by gifting interests within three years of death, neither 
would he worsen it. 
 
While even those contributions made more than three years before death may 
involve the hopes of eventual estate tax savings, the structure is far more likely to bear 
the markings of legitimacy.  Typically, the transferor after the formation of the FLLE will 
transfer interests to others, providing legitimate dispersion of interests. Also, my intent is 
to provide a bright-line rule that will stop most of the abusive use of FLLEs while 
avoiding the need to regularly litigate whether or not that use is  abusive.  The older the 
FLLE is, the more legitimate it is likely to be, but some well-planned illegitimate ones 
may slip through the cracks.  That is a price I am willing to pay for a bright-line, easy to 
 
159 I.R.C. §§ 2035(b), 2001(a), (b), 2502(a). 
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apply rule.  Further, I do not think a general ban on the use of FLLEs for estate tax 
savings purposes is politically realistic. 
 
To minimize abuse, however, I add two additional rules which could bring assets 
back into the estate, even if they were contributed more than three years before death.  
This increases the complexity of the proposal, which I dislike, but the issues the rules 
address are important ones.   
 
The first rule is that the decedent must keep sufficient assets for his support even 
if the contributions to the FLLE are made more than three years before death.  If he 
does not, the contributed FLLE assets will be included in the decedent’s estate even if 
made more than three years before death.    I do not specify a fixed amount for support, 
so there is some risk of fudging and of litigation with the Service. The draconian nature 
of the penalty should insure that sufficient assets are retained outside of the FLLE for 
support.  I would define support here as “ordinary support,”  so that the  FLLE assets 
could be distributed to the decedent for extraordinary expenses, such as unexpected 
medical care (a heart transplant, for example).  The Service by a revenue procedure 
could provide a safe harbor for both ordinary and extraordinary support. 
 
The second rule involves marketable securities, which represent a unique 
opportunity for abuse, since  there is usually little reason to place them in an FLLE 
except for the availability of discounts.  Of course, even an FLLE operating a bona fide 
business might have some need for marketable securities.  As did the 2005 Joint 
Committee Proposal, I have I have selected one-third as a  threshold.  To the extent 
that marketable securities average more than one-third of the value of the assets of the 
FLLE during the three years preceding the decedent’s death,  all marketable securities 
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contributed by the decedent to an FLLE controlled by the decedent’s family as of the 
date of death will be included in the decedent’s estate, irrespective of when they were 
contributed by the decedent.  Generally, the contribution of property to an FLLE is tax 
free under I.R.C. § 721(a).  However, gain can be recognized on the contribution of 
marketable securities to an FLLE that constitutes an “investment company,” if the 
contribution has the effect of diversifying the contributor’s interest in marketable 
securities.160 Taxpayers actively try to avoid these rules for obvious reasons, and it is 
improbable that they would apply.  But if gain is recognized under these provisions on 
the contribution of marketable securities to the FLLE, those marketable securities would 
be excluded both for purposes of the one-third threshold and inclusion in the estate.  
 
Otherwise, property transfers to the FLLE more than three years before death 
would be respected.   The FLLE interests would be included in the decedent’s estate at 
whatever discounted value the estate can argue should apply with one limitation.  If 
some property was contributed within three years of death and some more than three 
years before death, the former would be included in the decedent’s estate.  The value of 
the FLLE interest would thus have to be reduced to take that fact into account.  
 
An FLLE for these purposes would include a limited partnership, LLC, or S-
corporation.  An S-corporation is an unlikely vehicle for this type of planning, because 
gain is recognized when an S-corporation distributes appreciated property to a 
shareholder (a FLLE taxed as a partnership generally does not recognize gain or loss 
 
160 I.R.C. §§ 351(e)(1) and 721(b).  To be more specific, gain is recognized if the partnership or 
corporation would be treated as an “investment company.”  In very general terms, an investment 
company will exist if more than 80% of the value of the assets of the partnership or corporation  consist of 
marketable securities and the contribution as the result of diversifying the transferor’s interests.  See 
Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c).  
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when distributing property to an owner).161 Nevertheless, like limited partnerships and 
LLCs, S-corporations typically impose a single level of taxation on income at the owner 
level and could conceivably be used in a manner comparable to limited partnerships 
and LLCs.  S-corporations are included to restrict opportunities for end-running the 
proposal.  The double-tax burden of c-corporations would make them an inappropriate 
vehicle for discount planning,162and thus they would not be included in the definition of 
an FLLE.163 
For section 2035 to apply under this proposal, control of the FLLE must generally 
stay within the decedent’s family.  When taxpayers use FLLEs for estate planning 
purposes, they typically want the interests to stay in the family.  If the interests are not 
mostly staying in the family, the FLLE is unlikely to be an estate planning device,  which 
is why that circumstance is not covered by the proposal.  Since I.R.C. § 2701 provides 
rules sometimes relevant for valuing FLLEs, it would seem an appropriate place to look 
for a definition of Afamily@ for these purposes.  I.R.C. § 2701 defines Afamily@ to include 
the transferor; the transferor=s spouse; a lineal descendant of the transferor or the 
transferor=s spouse, and the spouse of any such descendant; the definition also 
includes an ancestor of the transferor or the transferor=s spouse, and the spouse of any 
such ancestor.164 This definition excludes collaterals such as uncles and nephews; but 
 
161 See I.R.C. §' 311(b) and 731(a). 
162 C-corporations are subject to two levels of taxation, one at the corporate level and another at 
the shareholder level, when corporate income is distributed to shareholders as dividends.  See I.R.C. '' 
11, 301, 316.  Further, distributions of appreciated property by a C-corporation cause gain to be 
recognized by the corporation, and the shareholder receiving the property as a dividend has ordinary 
income to the extent of the fair market value of the property.  See I.R.C. '' 301, 311(b). 
163 A c-corporation can be converted to an s-corporation if it qualifies, but is subject to a 
corporate level tax for ten years after the election to the extent of the net gain inherent in the corporate 
assets at the time of the s-election, again making the c-corporation an unlike estate planning vehicle.  
See I.R.C. § 1374. 
164 See I.R.C. ' 2701(e)(1), (2). 
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such persons are less likely to be involved, and a definition of family already in use in a 
related area is more likely to find acceptance than would a more expanded definition.  
Similarly, for purposes of determining whether the decedent and his family controls the 
FLLE, the definition of control contained in I.R.C. §  2701 could be used.165 That section 
defines control for partnerships (including LLCs taxed as partnerships) as the holding of 
at least 50% of the capital or profit interests in the partnership.166 In the case of a limited 
partnership, control is defined as the holding of any general partnership interest .167 For 
corporations, control means the holding of at least 50% by vote or value of the stock of 
the corporation.168 The control test would be met if the family in the aggregate met 
these 50% tests. 
 
Transfer of interests to a strawman or similar figure would not be an easy way to 
avoid the control test as either adequate consideration would have to be paid or the 
transfer would be subjected to the rules for taxing gifts.  Both can represent significant 
hurdles.  Nonetheless, protection from this type of gambit is necessary.  Accordingly, 
the family  would be considered to have control regardless if it controls the FLLE directly 
or indirectly.  
 
My proposal would have several advantages.  While the marketable securities 
and “assets for support” aspects adds some complexity, the proposal on the whole is 
straight forward.   As the law stands now, there is still plenty of room for litigation.169 
Strangi-type fact patterns, where mostly marketable securities are transferred to an 
FLLE shortly before death in exchange for most of the FLLE interests, will not work.  But 
 
165 See I.R.C. ' 2701(b)(2). 
 166 See id. 
 167 See I.R.C. ' 2701(b)(2)(B)(ii).
168 I.R.C. ' 2701(b)(2)(A). 
169 See Cunningham supra  note 154. 
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creative tax practitioners will develop alternatives.  Of course, they will try to persuade 
their clients to form the FLLEs well before death.  They likely will encourage them to 
have the FLLE own property other than marketable securities.  Relatively low risk rental 
real estate might, for example, be added to the FLLE to justify the need for a liability 
shield.  Will that be enough to survive scrutiny?  What percentage of the FLLE must 
consist of rental real estate or property that justifies the need for the liability shield?  The 
courts may well be asked to decide.  The 5th Circuit in Kimbell felt that working interests 
in oil and gas wells sanctified the FLLE.  Will other courts in other circuits agree?  No 
one knows.  To what extent should Byrum apply?  Again, no one can say.  The Tax 
Court resisted applying Byrum in Bongard, though there were good arguments that it 
should have been applied.  Bongard was not appealed, but in a similar, future case, 
Byrum is sure to be argued and that argument may well be taken to the appellate level.  
This proposal would mostly end this type of  litigation.  Further, since it is fairly straight-
forward, it is not likely to generate much in the way of litigation itself. 
 
My proposal is not as theoretically pure as some.  Value can still “disappear”  
through discounts as long as there is sufficient advance planning.  Nor does it prevent 
all injustice.   A taxpayer in the prime of life and in all good faith could contribute 
business assets to an FLLE mostly because of the benefits of the liability shield, die 
unexpectedly within three years of death, and have the value of the assets fully included 
in her estate.   Or FLLE interests may be sold in good faith for fair value to family 
members, but the assets contributed by the decedent to the FLLE could still be brought 
back into the estate if contributed within three years of death.  But the proposal has the 
benefit of relative simplicity, and that more than offsets the disadvantages.  In a Code 
that is of Kafkaesq complexity, simplicity is a major virtue and one we should seek. 
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The proposal may also well be politically viable.  Practitioners at this point know 
what will not work:  Forming FLLEs shortly before death where the decedent does not 
retain enough assets for his support (though somewhat longer standing FLLEs are now 
being challenged by the Service170).  What they do not know is what will work.  Bongard 
did not suffer from the problems of most other cases, and the decedent still lost.  Will 
the circuit courts of appeal agree with Bongard?  How much safer does one have to be?  
Does the FLLE have to conduct a business and if so how much (barring weird Schutt-
type fact patterns)? Thus, practitioners when they form an FLLE, even if well before 
death, cannot be sure it will survive scrutiny.  Having a straight-forward approach which 
likely covers most of their needs may will find significant political support among them 
and the organizations to which they belong. 
 
Finally, while I am not equipped to compute the costs to the fisc of this proposal, I 
doubt if it is significant.  The cases have surely not shut down the FLLE industry, though 
they may require it to be more sophisticated.  Current law does not suggest an FLLE 
structure will fail if there is legitimate need for the liability shield, and that is not hard to 
come by.  As I noted above, rental real estate might be sufficient, though it is not clear 
what percentage the rental real estate has to be of the  FLLE’s assets. Taxpayers will 
continue to use FLLEs.  The proposal sets reasonable standards for their use and it 
does not seem that the proposal will dramatically increase that use.  The abusive cases 
tend to be formed when death is near, and the proposal would apply to them.  Indeed, 
the proposal would cover almost all of the litigated cases to date and typically arrive at 
the same result, as the taxpayers usually lost. 
 
170 In Estate of Korby v. Commissioner, 89 TCM (CCH) 1150 (2005), about three years elapsed 
between funding of the FLLE and the decedent’s death. 
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Conclusion 
The FLLE problem has been brewing for some time.  The litigation will not end 
anytime soon.  Practitioners will adjust to the cases, push the envelope, and the Service 
will presumably push back. There are no perfect solutions to legal problems.  As we get 
theoretically “purer,” we add complexity, which contributes its own host of problems. I 
believe my proposal provides a reasonable balance between the needs of the fisc to 
stop the abusive use of FLLEs as well as the needs of taxpayers to be able to take 
advantage of this long-standing estate planning device. 
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